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Abstract. The methods to come to judicial appointments can be various and they can be distinguished depending 
on how different actors interact in the process. Looking at these systems is important as they reveal much about 
the judicial body itself and  the role they perform within a specifi c legal framework. In this essay the author aims 
to consider what can be behind the norms contained in the treaties governing the European Union’s judicial 
institutions and to cast some light on what the judicial appointment process can tell about the role performed by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in the European context. Such topic has not received massive attention 
by scholars but yet it assumes great importance considering the vital impact of the rulings of the Court of Justice 
and the widespread demand for independent and impartial judiciaries. In examining the topic, the author takes into 
consideration the current rules for judicial appointments set out in the treaties, the newly created panel in charge 
with the evaluation of the suitability of the appointees to the Court of Justice of the European Union and the need 
to comply with the requirements set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, in light of the future 
accession of the European Union to it.
Keywords: judicial appointments, Court of Justice of the European Union, independent courts, European 
Convention on Human Rights
1.  Introduction: judicial selection, an underestimated topic in the European legal 
studies
“The appointment of judges to international courts has long been an unstudied area of 
sovereign activity. It has been described as a ‘shrouded process’.”1 
These words pronounced by Lord Mance2 in the occasion of a talk on the composition 
of the European Court of Justice express the idea that any person, who approaches the topic 
of international judicial selection, would ultimately get: despite the vital impact of their 
rulings on the everyday life of thousands of people and on institutions, their composition 
and the process through which the judges get nominated are often unknown.
Interest to the topic of international judicial selection seems to be a sort of new 
phenomenon.3 Academics has for long time understudied the issue or only incidentally 
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1 Lord Mance, J.: The Composition of the European Court of Justice, talk given to the United 
Kingdom Association for European Law, 19th October 2011, available at www.supremecourt.gov.uk/
docs/speech_111019.pdf 
2 Lord Jonathan Mance is a current member of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and 
also member of the newly created panel in charge with the evaluation of the nominees to the Court of 
Justice. Further details on such panel will be provided later. Infra, paragraph 3.
3 See e.g. Mackenzie, R.–Sands, Ph.: International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence 
of the International Judge. Harvard International Law Journal, 44 (2003) 1; Mackenzie, R.–Sands, 
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mentioned in relation with wider topics, such as judicial independence.4 Indeed, most of the 
literature on international judicial selection actually consists either in a description of the 
mechanism for the appointments to some international courts or in a dissertation on judicial 
independence. As a consequence of the little attention paid to the topic by scholars, the 
appointment procedures to international courts are often kept undiscovered to the public 
eye. Transparency and public accountability seem to play a different role and to be subjected 
to less strict requirements when it comes to judicial appointment to international courts. In 
fact, the choices made by the States or the international bodies in charge with them are not 
really discussed nor presented to the general public, which is actually not able, nor even 
interested most of the time, to form its own opinion on the matter. Nonetheless, there is an 
unquestionable link between the way a court is composed and the way it operates its duties, 
and that being acquired, it should be a fundamental rule for international courts to have 
transparent selection procedures, able to assure the independence and the best quality of the 
judicial body. Independence and transparency are strongly bound and if the latter is lacking 
the former can be easily contested.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), meaning the comprehensive body 
composed by the Court of Justice, the General Court and other specialized courts, represents 
no exception to the described situation. The CJEU has often been considered as the Union’s 
most successful institution, it has had and it still has a primary role in framing European 
Union law, in developing the European integration and yet, it is the least known institution 
within the European Union. The decision-making process is opaque and it is fair to concur 
with Professor Rasmussen who affi rmed that few others than some law professors 
specialized in the study of the Court can actually cite the name of more than one European 
judge,5 probably the one who got appointed by their own home state. An absolute 
anonymity, which appears even more unreasonable if we consider the broad media coverage 
dedicated all over Europe to the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States and 
their appointments procedure.6
On the contrary, when it comes to the European Union, it is not uncommon to get the 
idea that the topic of judicial selection is being underrated or, at least, considered by 
scholars merely from a procedural point of view. Each and every book on EU law contains 
at least a reference to the composition of the CJEU and the appointments procedure. What 
seems really to be missing is an in-depth analysis of the reasons lying beneath the choice of 
the particular method and the consequences carried by it, with particular consideration for 
the context and the political culture in which the appointment procedure takes place.7 It 
Ph.: Judicial Selection for the International Courts: Towards Common Principles and Practices. In: 
Kate Malleson–Peter H. Russel (eds): Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives from around the World. Toronto, 2006; Posner, E. A.–Yoo, J. C.: Judicial Independence 
in International Tribunals. California Law Review, 93 (2005) 1.
4 See for instance Burbank, S. B.–Friedman, B. (eds): Judicial Independence at the Crossroads. 
An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks (CA), 2002.
5 Rasmussen, H.: The European Court of Justice’s Competence Transgressions, Poor 
Reasonings and the Complete Non-transparency of Willensbildung, Legal Opinion, available at 
forskning.ku.dk/search/publicationdetail/?id=751bab90-1d49-11df-8ed1-000ea68e967b 
6 As again properly pointed out by Professor Rasmussen. Ibid.
7 Judicial independence is a culture, which has to be forged at the national so as the international 
level. It is strictly related to the political culture of the community and it is shaped by the relations 
between the branches of government. Therefore, when discussing judicial appointments to the Court 
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seems like European scholars promote the idea that knowing why some people have become 
judges of the CJEU is not as important as knowing how the treaties provide for the judges 
to be selected. The present work aims to consider what is behind the norms contained in the 
treaties and to cast some light on what the judicial appointment process can tell about the 
role assumed by the CJEU in the European context.
2. From an informal agreement to a codifi ed rule: one judge each Member State
Three articles of the treaties, as latest amended by the Lisbon Treaty, come into play for the 
purpose of the present work: Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Article 
253 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Article 254 
TFEU. 
The plain text of these norms represents almost everything that is at the moment 
known about the composition of the judicial bodies of the Union. Most of the literature 
focuses on the case law of the CJEU and on its active role in promoting the development of 
the European Union law and the legal integration of the Member States. The amount of 
writings and comments on the activity of the CJEU is not balanced with equal interest on 
the membership of the judicial bodies. As a matter of fact, it is possible to assert that very 
few words are actually spent on those performing judicial functions at the European Union 
level and on how they got there. 
The fi rst part of Article 19 (2) TEU reads as follows “The Court of Justice shall consist 
of one judge from each Member State. It shall be assisted by Advocates-General. The 
General Court shall include at least one judge per Member State”. As set out in Article 253 
TFEU, the Judges and the Advocates-General of the Court of Justice shall be persons 
“whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifi cations required for the 
appointment to the highest judicial offi ces in their respective countries or who are 
jurisconsults of recognised competence”. They are appointed for a renewable term of six 
years, by common accord of the governments of the Member States, “after consultation of 
the panel provided for in Article 255”. Article 254 TFEU asserts that the Judges of the 
General Court “shall possess the ability required for appointment to high judicial offi ce”.
The rule of one judge per Member State appeared for the fi rst time in the Treaty of 
Nice and has been confi rmed by the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, long before 
being fi xed in the Treaty, this rule had arisen as a long-lasting practice among the Member 
States.
It is worthwhile noting that, even though originally such a mechanism was nowhere 
stipulated, the Member States from the early beginning of the European Communities 
reached an informal agreement assigning to themselves the power to provide the judges to 
of Justice of the European Union it is important not only to point out the mechanism adopted and 
formalized in the treaties, but also the different interactions between the actors of the process and the 
cultural reasons that lead to a particular method of selection. That would reveal much on the state of 
development of judicial independence and would refl ect the peculiar political culture of the European 
Union. Using this approach for the analysis of the specifi c topic leads to observe the growth of the 
European Union as a political community. For a recent and complete analysis on the culture of judicial 
independence see Shetreet, S.–Forsyth, Ch. (eds): The Culture of Judicial Independence. Leiden, 
2012. On the concept of political culture see Grossman, J. B.–Sarat, A.: Political Culture and Judicial 
Research. Washington University Law Quarterly, (1971) 177. 
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the Court, picking them from among their citizens.8 The origins of this agreement can be 
traced back to the creation of the fi rst Court of Justice of the European Communities, as a 
common judicial body of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European 
Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
Back then the six founding states set out some of the rules that still govern judicial 
appointment to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In fact, the original treaties 
contained a formula, framed on the Statute of the International Court of Justice at The 
Hague, which required the judges to be chosen “from among persons of indisputable 
independence who fulfi ll the conditions required for the holding of the highest offi ce in 
their respective country or who are jurists of recognized competence”.9 The treaties were 
silent regarding the nationality of the judges and they only set out that the Member States 
had to act in “common agreement” when selecting the judges. The practice adopted by the 
Member States showed that on the one hand they had reached an informal agreement 
assigning to each of them one position on the Court10 and never exerting the veto power on 
the other states’ nominations; on the other hand, they all picked from among their citizens 
and so it has been done from that moment on,11 although it was not back then and still it is 
not prohibited to nominate a person of a different nationality.12 
Unlike the nationality rule, which, however, still resists as a praxis, the rule of one 
judge per Member State is now written in the text of the treaties, even though only with 
regards to the Court of Justice.13 Two main reasons seem to lay beneath the choice of giving 
  8 Feld, W.: The Judges of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Villanova Law 
Review, (1964), 41.
  9 Euratom Treaty, Article 139; EEC Treaty Article, Article 167; ECSC Treaty, Article 32b.
10 They also set special rules for the distribution of the posts depending on who was the 
President of the Court and who was the President of one of the Communities. At that time the members 
of the Court of Justice were seven, due to the need to have an uneven composition. It meant that one 
State could be asked to appoint two judges. Interestingly, it seems that those having two judges were 
somehow restored for having none of their nationals in such positions. Feld: op. cit. 43–44.
11 Some inferred this rule from the one expressly provided for the executive organs of the 
Communities, who must be nationals of the Member States. Others asserted that, since it was not 
expressly required for the Court, that requirement did not apply. Nonetheless, the Member States gave 
a valid argument to the fi rst theory. Ibid. 41. 
12 It is interesting to point out the constrast with the European Court of Human Rights, where 
there has been the case of Lichtenstein selecting a judge from Switzerland.
13 It is important to note that the different expression used for the General Court (“at least one 
judge”) has allowed the Court of Justice President, Mr. Vassilios Skouris, to request in 2011 the 
enlargement of the General Court from 27 members to 39. Accordingly to his letter this change to the 
composition would help the General Court to keep up with the increasing workload. The Parliament 
has supported this proposition and a legislative procedure had been started, which concluded in 
August 2012 actually enforcing some major changes to the CJEU Statute (infra fn. 16), but postponing 
to next year the more political sensitive request such as the one regarding the additional posts to the 
General Court. In fact the Member States have not been able to reach a shared solution on the way to 
select the new judges. They showed their own interest in maintaining the balance of one judge per 
Member State and so doing they actually proved all the fl aws of such a system. None would easily 
agree in giving up on the possibility to nominate an extra judge, thus now it has to be faced the 
problem of making the General Court effi cient with the approval of the Member States. Allegedly the 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament’s Legal Affair Committee are willing to 
overcome the Member States resistances and to address this issue by September 2013, which could 
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the power of judicial selection to the governments of the Member States.14 First, it is 
important to remember that the European institutions are deemed to suffer a defi cit of 
democratic and political legitimacy. The CJEU is not exempted from this critique.15 
However, a court composed of members chosen by democratically elected governments 
might refl ect part of the legitimacy recognized to the governments themselves. Moreover, a 
court made of judges coming from every and each legal system might be seen as more 
trustworthy by people who will eventually be asked to comply with the rulings rather than a 
court composed exclusively of foreigners. Confi dence in the judiciary is essential to the 
acceptance of the rulings. This essential value is strengthened by the acknowledgement of 
the independence, both internal and external of the judicial body. Nonetheless, when it 
comes to a supra-national court it is fair to imagine that the presence of judges coming from 
the various national legal system would play a part in creating confi dence, trust and 
consequently legitimacy. The need of representation of the various legal systems which 
coexist within the European Union is the other side of the coin and it represents the second 
reason for choosing an appointment system such as the one currently adopted at the CJEU. 
Knowing that the national background is represented might be very important when it 
comes to international disputes. Thus, even though no reasonable government would ever 
consider a judge to the Court of Justice as representing the appointing State itself, her 
presence means that the domestic context is properly taken into account if necessary for the 
decision and that it will play a part in the creation of the law of the Union. 
Notwithstanding the importance of strengthening legitimacy and giving representation 
of the different legal systems, one cannot ignore that the current appointment system results 
to be questionable. It gives an hardly controllable power to the governments, which are not 
asked to justify their choices or to comply with anything but very broad requirements 
regarding the qualifi cation of the appointees. It is undoubtable that such a procedure lacks 
transparency. Moreover, both arguments might reasonably be considered weak, due to the 
fact that at present time the Court of Justice is quite unlikely to operate in plenary session16 
require a treaty change. For an overview of the procedure see the dedicated page of the Legislative 
Observatory of the European Parliament’s website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/
fi cheprocedure.do?reference=2011/0901A(COD)&l=en
14 See e.g. Arnull, A.: The European Union and its Court of Justice. Oxford, 2006. See also 
Tomuschat, C.: National representation of judges and legitimacy of international jurisdictions: lesson 
from ICJ to ECJ? In: Pernice, I.–Kokott, J.–Saunders, Ch. (eds): The Future of the European Judicial 
System in a Comparative Perspective. Baden-Baden, 2006.
15 See e.g. Rasmussen, H.: On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. A Comparative 
Study in Judicial Policymaking. Dordrecht, 1986; Caldeira, G. A.–Gibson, J. L.: The Legitimacy of 
the Court of Justice in the European Union: models of Institutional Support. The American Political 
Science Review, 89 (1995) 2, 356–376; Caldeira, G. A.–Gibson, J. L.: Democracy and legitimacy in 
the European Union: the Court of Justice and its constituents. International Social Science Journal, 
49 (1997) 52, 209–224; Gibson, J. L.–Caldeira, G. A.: Changes in the Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Justice. British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998) 1, 63–91; Dehousse, R.: The European 
Court of Justice. The politics of Judicial Integration. NewYork, 1998.
16 According to Article 16 (4) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union the 
Court of Justice sits as a full Court when dealing with specifi c issues: dismissal of the Ombudsman at 
request of the European Parliament [Article 228 (2) TFEU]; ruling the compulsory retirement or the 
deprivation of rights to a pension or to benefi t of a Member of the Commission for breach of his 
obligations [Article 245 (2) TFEU and Article 247 TFEU]; ruling the compulsory retirement or the 
deprivation of rights to a pension or to benefi t of Member of the Court of Auditors if he does not any 
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and it is not required for a judge coming from a specifi c Member State to be part of the 
chamber that will decide a case involving her home country.17
Indeed, even though, as already stated, the European way to judgeship has not received 
considerable attention by scholars, some questions have been raised from time to time and 
the debate seems to be fi nally developing. The existence of a strong connection between the 
independence of the judiciary and the method of selecting judges has never been denied by 
the academics, but quite surprisingly the topic has been invested with little attention, except 
for few relevant works which still set the parameters for those who decide to spend some 
time studying the topic. One of these exceptions is represented by Werner Feld’s article 
published in 1963.18 Back then Professor Feld pointed out the odd of the system of national 
allocation of the posts to the Court of Justice. Some of the questions he posed are still 
unresolved and its inquiry still leads the work of other scholars in this fi eld, as properly 
recognised in her 1998 essay by Sally J. Kenney,19 which represents itself another exception 
to the little academic interest.
The European Parliament has also raised the problem of the politicisation of 
appointments and it has in various occasions proposed alternative selection procedures, 
which would increase its infl uence.20 For instance, in 1982 it adopted a resolution proposing 
to be involved in the appointment procedure subjecting the nominations to its ratifi cation.21 
That would give the European Parliament a power similar to that of the Senate of the United 
States where the appointment by the President of the Supreme Court Justices is subject to 
advice and consent by the upper chamber of the Congress.22 Furthermore, in 1993 the 
European Parliament proposed to be invested with the power to elect judges for a nine years 
non-renewable term.23 Such a suggestion, although opposed by the Court of Justice,24 was 
longer fulfi ll the requirement or meet the obligations arising form his offi ce [Article 286 (6) TFEU]. 
The Court might also decide, under Article 16 (5), to sit as a full court in cases of exceptional 
importance, after hearing the Advocate General. 
  It is interesting to mention that since the Court of Justice rarely operates as a full court and in 
order to have more judges partecipating in the decisions, on August 11, 2012 the European Parliament 
and the Council have adopted a Regulation (No 741/2012) which amends Article 16 (2) increasing the 
number of judges sitting in the Grand Chamber from 13 to 15.
17 As, on the contrary, it is the case for the European Court of Human Rights.
18 Feld: op. cit.
19 Kenney, S. J.: The Members of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Columbia 
Journal of European Law, (1998) 5, 101. See also Kenney, S. J.: The Judges of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities. In: Kenney, S. J.–Reisinger, W. M.–Reitz, J. (eds): Constitutional 
Dialogues in Comparative Perspective. New York, 1999.
20 For an overview on the proposal presented by the Parliament to increase its infl uence on the 
procedure see Kenney: The Judges of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. op. cit. 
21 Resolution of the European Parliament’s Position Concerning the Reform of the Treaties and 
the Achievement of European Union, 1982, OJ (C 238) 25, 6 July 1982.
22 Neville Brown, L.–Kennedy, T.: The Court of Justice of the European Communities. London, 
2000. 48.
23 Debates of the European Parliament, 9 February 1994, n. 3-442/139, Role of the European 
Parliament in the Appointment of Judges to the Court of Justice of the European Communities. See on 
the proposition of the Parliament, Chalmers, D.–Tomkins, A.: European Union Public Law. 
Cambridge, 2007. 144–145.
24 In 1994, the European Council decided to set up a Study Group to prepare for the work of the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference provided for under Article N(2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
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eventually included in the Resolution on the General Outline for a Draft Revision of the 
Treaties25 but yet not adopted by the Member States.
More recently, during the preparatory works for the Constitution for Europe, the 
Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice considered the question of reforming the 
appointment procedures both for the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (now 
General Court).26 Although the majority of the members of the Circle concluded that all the 
provisions regarding the number of the judges to both courts, the appointment procedure, 
and the length of term, should remain unchanged, it is interesting to note what other 
solutions had been considered. In fact, “some members felt that appointment should be by 
act of the Council and, of these, several felt that the Council should act by a qualifi ed 
majority”.27 Also, the Circle under the suggestion made both by the President of the Court 
of Justice and the President of the Court of First Instance, considered the possibility to 
introduce a twelve or nine years non-renewable term of offi ce. Finally, it expressed its favor 
to the creation of a panel of experts for the evaluation of the nominees (as the one that will 
be then provided for under Article 255 TFEU), which would include one person nominated 
by the Parliament, even though that raised the contrary opinion of one member of the 
Circle.
Yet, it is interesting to recall the Report of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities published in 1995 by the Court of Justice itself. In this report, prepared on the 
occasion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference,28 it was clearly affi rmed that the Court 
acknowledged the above-mentioned reasons underneath the choice for a certain process of 
judicial selection. Nevertheless, considering the already large composition of the European 
Court of Justice, increasing the membership would have made concrete the risk of crossing 
“the invisible boundary between a collegiate court and a deliberative assembly”,29 especially 
when the Court was sitting as a full court.30 This concern was particularly strong considering 
the prospects of enlargement of the Union, which would have considerably increased the 
members of Union, and consequently the judges to the Court. Therefore, the Court 
suggested in the report not to maintain the link between the number of the judges and the 
number of the Member States, “even though the treaties do not provide for any link between 
It asked the institutions to draw up reports on the operation of the Treaty and the Court responded 
fi ling its own report. On the specifi c topic we are dealing with, the Court expressed its fi rm opposition. 
As written in paragraph 17, the proposal of the Parliament was considered unaccetable. The Court 
stated in the report that “Prospective appointees would be unable adequately to answer the questions 
put to them without betraying the discretion incumbent upon persons whose independence must, in 
the words of the treaties, be beyond doubt and without prejudging positions they might have to adopt 
with regard to contentious issues which they would have to decide in the exercise of their judicial 
function.” Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the treaty on European 
Union, Luxembourg, May 1995, available at http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/4/2/ 
3644862f-2e8f-4170-9616-e573a41b61c5/publishable_en.pdf 
25 Resolution on the General Outline for a Draft Revision of the Treaties, 1997, OJ (C 33) 66. 
(B4-0040/97), 16 January 1997.
26 Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice, March 25, 2003, available at 
http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/en/03/cv00/cv00636.en03.pdf
27 Ibid.
28 Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice, supra fn. 26.
29 Ibid.
30 Supra fn. 16.
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nationality and membership of the Court”.31 As it is well known by now, that rule of one 
judge per Member State became a written one few years later. 
Indeed, none of the different proposals coming from the scholars, the European 
Parliament, and the Court itself, have been embraced by the Member States, which, while 
drafting the Constitution for Europe, later transformed into the Lisbon Treaty, decided to 
maintain the status quo. 
3. The new panel
One important innovation is actually contained in the Lisbon Treaty. Under Article 255 
TFEU, it is created a panel in charge with the evaluation of the suitability of the appointees 
has been created. This is probably the only response to those who hoped for some innovation 
with regards to the appointment procedure. At fi rst glance, this body seems to have the 
possibility to partially reframe the judicial appointments in Europe, even though the fi nal 
say on the procedure rests in the hands of the Member States. According to the treaties and 
the Rules regulating the panel, its role is quite limited, as it can only provide a not binding 
opinion on the nominees proposed by the national governments. Nonetheless, in the short 
time the panel has operated, it has demonstrated to be willing to perform a more incisive 
role than the one originally assigned to it. Indeed, the opinions on the suitability of the 
nominees, even though still merely advisory, are taken into great consideration by the 
Member States. 
Trying to evaluate the panel is far from easy, as very little is known about it and 
information are diffi cult to fi nd. Therefore, for the purpose of the present work we 
particularly rely on the insights offered by Lord Mance,32 in order to evaluate the practical 
impact of the innovation brought by Article 255 TFEU. 
In the early months of 2010, the President of the Court of Justice, Mr. Skouris, 
submitted two important recommendations, one setting the rules for the panel and the other 
nominating the seven members of the brand new body.33 Two decisions of the Council of 
the European Union followed the recommendations.34  Introducing the rules for the panel, 
the President explained his will to limit the provisions only to issues relating to “the powers 
of the panel and the relations which the panel may have with other parties.”35 Therefore, the 
shortness of the rule is actually to be attributed to a specifi c intention of the drafters, who 
decided for what concerns other issues to defer to the provisions of the TFEU or to the 
practice of the panel itself. The TFEU does not actually contain provisions other than 
Article 255 regarding the panel. That means that at the end of the day, this body is self-
31 Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice, supra fn. 26.
32 Lord Mance: The Composition of the European Court of Justice. op. cit. 
33 Recommendation relating the operating rules of the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU 
of 11 January 2010 (5195/10) and Recommendation concerning the composition of the panel provided 
for in Article 255 TFEU of 2 February 2010 (5932/10).
34 Council Decision relating to the operating rules of the panel provided for in Article 255 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010, OJ (L 50) 18 (2010/125/EU), 25 February 
2010; Council Decision appointing the members of the panel provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010, OJ (L 50) 20, 25 February 2010.
35 Recommendation relating the operating rules of the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU, 
supra fn. 33.
32 CAMILLA CORDELLI
governed and can autonomously develop its own practice. Such a thing has indeed 
happened, as clearly stated in Lord Mance’s lecture.
The original rules are only nine and they are limited to provide general principles that 
should guide the advisory body. Interestingly, Rule No. 2 refers to the composition of the 
panel, stating that the seven members, including the one nominated by the European 
Parliament, shall be chosen among judges of the national supreme courts and lawyers. 
According to Rule No. 3 the members of the panel are appointed for four years and their 
mandate can be renewed.36
When in 2010 President Skouris proposed the names of the seven members of the 
panel, he made clear the will to accomplish a twofold goal. On the one hand, there was the 
necessity to assure even representation of the European legal systems; on the other hand, 
the membership of the panel had to be geographically balanced. It is noteworthy that the 
President does not refer to the necessity of having a gender balanced composition. 
Unfortunately, nothing is said in the recommendation that can help understanding the 
reasons behind these choices. Nonetheless, the list of names suggests a series of 
considerations.
Firstly, it is interesting to observe that with the only exception of Ms Vallelersundi, the 
member nominated by the Parliament, all the other members come from the bench. It would 
not be correct to assert that the members have a common professional background, since 
two of them are former judges of the European judicial bodies and the other exert their 
functions in different national courts. Nonetheless, it is relevant that six members on seven 
are judges. Moreover, observing the composition of the panel from another perspective it 
seems even more relevant that the one component of the panel nominated by the Parliament 
is a person with political experience, having Ms Vallelersundi had a seat at the European 
Parliament. This data it is particularly interesting in light of the process that brought to the 
drafting of Article 255. As previously pointed out, the role of the European Parliament in 
the appointment process has been strongly debated during the drafting of the Constitution 
for Europe and the subsequent period of time that brought to the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Once excluded the power of the Parliament to appoint a judge, the Discussion Circle 
on the Court of Justice concluded that the attribution to the Parliament of the power to 
nominate one member of the panel was appropriate, despite the contrary opinion of one 
participant to the Discussion Circle, who was concerned with the risk of politicisation of 
the process. In fact the fi rst person the Parliament selected for the panel stands out from the 
rest of the membership for her background. Ms Vallelersundi is a lawyer, but more 
importantly, she was a member of the European Parliament. Unlike the other members of 
the panel, Ms Vallelersundi’s nomination has an undoubtable political dimension. 
Nonetheless, the infl uence of the Parliament over the appointment procedure is limited and 
it is hard to recognize a real risk of politicisation. The Parliament has the power to select 
only one person on seven, therefore the power of this member may be easily neutralized by 
the other members. Moreover, it is to remember the extremely limited power should be 
36 Currently, the seven members of the Panel are: Mr Jean-Marc Sauvé, President of the Panel, 
currently Vice President of the Council of State of the French Republic; Mr Peter Jann, judge at the 
ECJ from 19 January 1995 to 6 October 2009; Lord Mance, currently member of the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom; Mr. Torben Melchior, currently President of the Supreme Court of Denmark; 
Mr. Péter Paczolay, currently President of the Constitutional Court of Hungary; Ms Ana Palacio 
Vallelersundi, lawyer in Madrid and member of the European Parliament between 1994 and 2002; Ms 
Virpi Tiili, judge at the CFI from 18 January 1995 to 6 October 2009.
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remembered, even though, as recalled by Lord Mance, this body has from the very 
beginning tried to be as effective as possible. As a matter of fact, the persuasive force of the 
opinions of the panel is not enough to overcome some objective limits, such as the 
impossibility for the experts to take into account specifi c needs of the European judicial 
bodies, as they can only evaluate the candidates picked by the Member States. The panel 
cannot evaluate careers and expertises or balance skills, experience or gender on the Court 
and the Member States entirely maintain their prerogatives in picking one name from the 
bunch. Thus, considering the limited effect of the parliamentary nomination over the work 
of the panel, and the limited effect of the panel over the appointment process, it seems quite 
unlikely that the presence of a member nominated by the European Parliament may 
resemble a threat to the independence of the body. This kind of critique may be attributed to 
the European tradition (at least in continental Europe) of isolating the judicial power from 
the other branches of the government. A direct parliamentary participation in the selection 
of the judiciary it is quite rare in Europe and this has deep historical roots.  On the contrary, 
the selection of the justices that will sit at the Supreme Court bench in the United States is a 
duty of the Executive branch of the Government. In addition to that, the role of advisory 
body, which ultimately gives its consent to the appointment, is performed by the Senate of 
the United States.37
Few more things need to be pointed out with regard to the panel provided for in Article 
255, and once again the comparison with American experience might be very helpful. 
According to Rule No. 6, once the government of the Member State has found the name of 
the candidate, the General Secretariat of the Council is required to transmit it to the 
President of the panel. Then, if the body fi nds it necessary, it can ask the national 
government to provide further information. As set out in Rule No. 7, the panel has also the 
power to call the candidate for a hearing that may be held in private. At a fi rst glance, it 
looks like the panel has actual discretion whether to meet the potential judge or not. 
Actually, the discretion may be the result of a compromise reached among different views 
on how the panel should operate. In fact, the Discussion Circle had excluded the possibility 
for the panel to hold hearings. The panel has interpreted the Rule “to mean that in case of a 
new appointment it must have a hearing, in the case of a re-appointment it cannot have a 
hearing”.38 It is interesting to observe that the hearings are excluded in the cases of re-
37 Even though Article 2(2) of the Constitution of the United States refers to the body as a 
whole, since 1868 the Senate has deferred part of the “advice and consent” function to a standing 
committee: the Judiciary Committee. The Senate Judiciary Committee is one of the most infl uential 
standing committee in the United States Senate. It performs legislative and oversight roles, not limited 
to the one concerning judicial nominations to the federal bench. However, massive attention to its 
activity is brought by the screening conducted on the nominees to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The membership of the Committee is determined at the start of every Congress according to a 
ratio of majority to minority members in the Senate. Each party decides the members that will seat in 
the Committee and consequently two resolutions are adopted by the Senate: one regarding the 
majority membership; and one regarding the minority membership. The Committee itself will then 
divide the members into Subcommittee panels, although the hearings of the judicial candidates happen 
in front of the full Committee. The total number of senators composing the Committee is now 18: 10 
for the majority and 8 for the minority. All the members of the Committee are politicians selected 
within their own party, however it is of some interest to note that most of them have a specifi c 
background as attorneys.
38 Lord Mance: The Composition of the European Court of Justice. op. cit.
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appointment. Apparently the panel has considered the a posteriori evaluation of the judge as 
something that would threat his or her independence, however, one could argue that it is 
actually after a fi rst term of offi ce that the panel would have concrete elements to give an 
opinion on the suitability of the person. That being said, it is remarkable that, in any event, 
the hearings would not be public. According to Rule No. 8, the panel is compelled to state 
the reasons for its opinions and to forward them to the representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States. Moreover, if the Presidency requires it, the President of the panel 
shall present that opinion to the representatives of the Governments of the Member States’ 
meeting within the Council. No other duty of publicity is placed over the panel’s work.
At least fi ve members of the panel must participate at any meeting and, as stated under 
Rule No. 5, the deliberations of the Panel are to be taken in camera. This means that, unless 
the body will develop a different practice in the next years and it will increase transparency, 
from the outside it is possible to have only an ex post knowledge of the work of the panel. 
However, due to the increasing infl uence of the decisions taken at the European level by the 
Court of Justice and the General Court, it might be reasonable to ask for public hearings 
similar to the ones that usually take place in front of the Senate of the United States. That 
would balance the lack of transparency of national governments’ decisions about the 
nominees. 
As more than once observed, the Member States are substantially free to decide who to 
appoint to the CJEU. Many different reasons may lay beneath the choice and actually none 
of them is clearly expressed. The introduction of an advisory panel seems to respond to the 
necessity to assure that the person selected by the national government, to whom the other 
governments had expressed their consent, will fi t in the CJEU. In fact Article 255 
specifi cally refers to the panel as a body called to express an opinion on the suitability of 
the candidates. Unlike the Senate in the United States, the panel does not have the power to 
give the consent to the nomination; its function appears to be narrowed to give an opinion 
with respect to a decision still under the control of the national governments. Nonetheless, 
requiring public hearings would have been important to increase the transparency of the 
whole process. The Member States would have their autonomy in the decision untouched, 
but the candidates would have been placed under public observation prior to their formal 
admission to the European judiciary. 
Still, it is to mention that the publicity given to the confi rmation hearings in the United 
States in occasion of the modern appointments is not subject to unanimous approval. Some 
scholars argue that publicity opens to excessive attention by the media and this makes the 
process even more controversial. However, for what it concerns the Court of Justice, but 
also the General Court, a little bit more of knowledge would be desirable and would 
compensate the current obscurity. Finally, another argument may be brought to oppose 
public hearings. In terms of time and economic resources, setting hearings open to public 
would probably cost more than private hearings. Especially, because the rules for the panel 
seem to leave the decision whether to hold the hearings under the discretion of the body. 
This argument may have some merits, however, the interest for transparent appointments 
should have precedence. 
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4.  The requirements set by the ECHR and the European Charter 
for an independent judiciary
Finally, the topic of judicial appointments to the CJEU acquires new relevance in light of 
Article 6 (2) TEU,39 which envisages the accession of the Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). The Convention, which already represents a source of inspiration 
for the Court, will inevitably affect the practice adopted by the Union with regard to judicial 
appointments, as Article 6 (1) of the Convention affi rms the right to a hearing “by an 
independent and impartial tribunal”.40 A similar provision is also contained in Article 47 (2) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,41 which has acquired a new 
legal status after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In order to comply with these 
rules, especially the one contained in the Convention as interpreted by the European Court 
of Human Rights, the European Union needs to make sure that the judicial appointment 
procedure leaves no room for doubts on politicization or lack of independence.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has provided from early times an 
interpretation of the word “independent” as referred to judgeship. Whenever the ECtHR 
deals with issues regarding the right to an independent and impartial tribunal it states, as a 
general principle, that “in order to establish whether a body can be considered “independent”, 
regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and to their 
term of offi ce, to the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and to the question 
whether the body presents an appearance of independence.”42 The connection between the 
appointment procedure and the perceived and concrete independence of the judges emerges 
clearly. As a consequence, the European Union is now more than ever compelled to consider 
what has been stated by the ECtHR. The appointment procedure, as set out under the Treaty 
of Lisbon, is not fl awless and probably not completely in line with the ECHR and the case 
law of the Strasbourg Court.
Both Article 253 and Article 254 TFEU require the Member States to appoint judges 
“whose independence is beyond doubt” and the Statute of the CJEU provides in Title 1 for 
39 Article 6 (2) TEU: The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences 
as defi ned in the treaties. 
40 Article 6 (1) ECHR: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
41 Article 47 (2) Charter: Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
42 See among the others Sacilor Lormines v. France, no. 65411/01, judgment of 9 November 
2006, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-XIII; Brudnicka and Others v. Poland, no. 54723/00, 
§ 38, ECHR 2005-II; Findlay v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p. 281, § 73; Bryan v. the United Kingdom, no. 19178/91, judgment 
of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A; Langborger v. Sweden, judgment of 22 June 1989, Series 
A no. 155, p. 16. para 32. 
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specifi c guarantees.43 However, independence is certainly threatened because of the broad 
power attributed to the national governments when picking the nominees. The lack of 
transparency in the selection procedures adopted by the Member States and the short 
renewable term, make the current system biased. The anonymity when adopting the 
decisions, the absence of any sort of dissenting opinion and the distribution of the cases to 
chambers (which means that not necessarily the judge appointed by one State would decide 
the case involving his own country) only partially balance the threat to independence.
Judicial independence is considered a sensitive topic not only by the ECtHR but also 
by the Council of Europe, which has dedicated wide attention to it.44 For this purpose, it has 
from time to time required45 the High Contracting Parties of the Convention to increase 
transparency, accountability, and consistency in the national procedure for nominating 
candidates to the ECtHR to be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly. In addition to the 
effort of the Council itself, the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human 
Rights (Interights) published in 2003 a report entitled “Judicial Independence: Law and 
Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights”.46 From the detailed 
analysis developed by Professor Dr. Jutta Limbach and the other components of the group, 
it emerges that the national procedures “are often inadequate, politicised and so opaque that 
they are barely understood, even by some judges appointed by them. There is no meaningful 
review of these procedures at the international level, and no effective safeguards against 
43 Article 2 Statute of the CJEU: Before taking up his duties each Judge shall, before the Court 
of Justice sitting in open court, take an oath to perform his duties impartially and conscientiously and 
to preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court. 
Article 3 (1): The Judges shall be immune from legal proceedings. After they have ceased to hold 
offi ce, they shall continue to enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed by them in their offi cial 
capacity, including words spoken or written. 
Article 4 (1), (2), (3): The Judges may not hold any political or administrative offi ce. 
They may not engage in any occupation, whether gainful or not, unless exemption is exceptionally 
granted by the Council, acting by a simple majority. 
When taking up their duties, they shall give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their 
term of offi ce, they will respect the obligations arising there from, in particular the duty to behave 
with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold offi ce, of certain 
appointments or benefi ts. 
44 An important contribution to the debate on judicial appointments has come from the Venice 
Commission, which has studied the topic both at the national and international or supra-national level. 
With reference to the former, it is interesting to mention the analysis on the appointments procedures 
to constitutional courts The Composition of Constitutional Courts, CDL-AD(2007)028. The Venice 
Commission particularly focuses on proposing a list of standards which should be respected in order 
to ensure internal ad external judicial independence. For an overview see the Venice Commission’s 
Report on the Judicial System. Part I: The Independence of Judges, CDL-AD(2010)004.
45 As a mere example see the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the selection of 
candidates for the post of judge at the European Court of Human Rights, Adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 28 March 2012 at the 1138th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, CM(2012)40 fi nal, 
available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2012)40&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=fi nal&S
ite=COE&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383
46 Limbach, J.–Cruz Villalón, P.–Errera, R.–Lester, A.–Morshchakova, T.–Sedley, S.–Zoll, A.: 
Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights. 
London, May 2003.
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arbitrariness.”47 The report concludes stating that “while accepting the diversity of legal 
systems in Europe, minimum standards should be issued to States on the essential procedural 
steps and safeguards that should be undertaken in the judicial nomination process”.48
A similar conclusion could also apply to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and it appears quite likely that some of these inputs to the European Union will come from 
the ECtHR itself, which has posed under strict scrutiny the national procedures, taking into 
account the criticism contained in the report and issuing a series of recommendations. The 
European Union will be then expected to comply with these requirements not only as a 
member of the Convention, which will eventually candidate a judge to the ECtHR, but also 
in regard with its own Court because of the legal obligation under Article 6 of the 
Convention.
5. Rethinking judicial appointments to the Court of Justice of the European Union
Concluding the present essay, it is important to refl ect on possible reforms to the 
appointment procedure, which should take into account the concerns expressed by the 
Strasbourg Court and other observers mentioned so far. In developing the topic, it is 
important to consider not only what kind of body the Court of Justice has become, but also 
what kind of body the Union would aim it to be. Given the important role played in the 
process of European integration, the Court of Justice should be preserved from critiques 
regarding its independence, which could damage its reputation and diminish its already 
questioned legitimacy. Therefore, in the last part of the present work I try to evaluate a 
possible and maybe desirable reform scenario for judicial appointments.
It has been pointed out that most of the work of the European judges is done in 
chambers. Justifying the current system of appointments with the need to provide a national 
legal background does not sound reasonable anymore. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union should be a totally independent institution and breaking the link between judges and 
States should be the fi rst step to the take in the direction of developing a real Court of the 
European Union, living of autonomous legitimacy. In this sense it is interesting to spend 
some words on the proposal presented in 2011 by the President of the Court of Justice to 
increase the number of judges of the General Court from 27 to 39.49 The resistance 
immediately shown by the Member States and the impossibility to reach a compromise on a 
new appointment system for the General Court, led the European Parliament to postpone 
such a controversial reform and it all confi rms how fearful are the appointing states to have 
their selection powers diminished. 
The Commission, in an opinion released on September 30, 2011, has proposed to the 
Member States two possible models for fi lling the vacant seats at the General Court.50 Even 
being the issue reserved for later analysis, the European Union’s institutions and the States 
will have to take a step towards a reform of the appointment procedure to the General 
Court, therefore the two suggestions written in the Commission opinion are worth to be 
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Supra fn. 13.
50 Commission opinion on the requests for the amendment of the Statute of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, presented by the Court, September 30th, 2011, available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0596:FIN:EN:HTML
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taken into consideration. The fi rst model would be based on a rotating system, to be 
regulated according to a previously drawn up list. The General Court would be composed 
of at least one judge per Member States, as the treaties already command, but some States 
would have (maximum) two judges sitting on the bench. According to the Commission 
opinion, their terms must be staggered over the three year period of partial renewal, in order 
to avoid competition among the judges, which might happen if their terms happen to fall at 
the same time. The second model proposed by the Commission takes more into account the 
specifi city of the General Court and tries to balance it with the need for even national 
representation. The General Court is, according to the Commission opinion “structured 
more in terms of specialised chambers for each subject”.51 That being said the Commission 
proposed to nominate half of the new judges accordingly to this need of specialised skills. 
Either way, it is self-evident that the States need to fi nd a way to break, at least for the 
General Court, the bound they have created between number of judges and number of 
States. 
Again, in rethinking judicial appointments to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union it would be important to give the panel provided for under Article 255 TFEU more 
infl uential role, allowing it to issue a binding opinion on the suitability of the nominees and 
also requiring the publicity of the hearings. At the same time, it would be essential that the 
States reveal the procedure adopted for the selection and the reasons behind the choice 
following, for instance, the example set by the Netherlands.52 The panel should be able to 
determine whether the candidate not only possesses the legal qualifi cation to perform the 
role, but also if he or she would fi t the Court needs in term of diversity. Giving this power 
to an independent body of expert instead of to the Parliament or the Council would preserve 
form undue political infl uences. Moreover, giving the power of screening the nominees to 
politicians coming from the same States as those which have the power to nominate is 
unlikely to alter the predominance of the States.
Finally, a change, that could be applicable even leaving untouched the current 
appointment procedure, would be to introduce a longer non-renewable term. In fact, this 
kind of reform should be on top of the reform’s list of the Union and it could coexist with 
all the other proposals mentioned above. Introducing a longer term of offi ce would partially 
balance the fl aws of the current system and would at least reduce the risk of having undue 
infl uences on the judges from the governments.
As above mentioned, reforming the mechanism for judicial appointments is a 
politically controversial issue and that is proved by the postponement of the project of 
increasing the number of judges of the General Court. In a time of crisis, such as the current 
one, when the European Union is facing hard battles every day and when national 
governments seem sometimes to be willing to take back part of their prerogatives, it is 
easily understandable how diffi cult it becomes asking to endorse this reform project. 
Nonetheless, it would be of great importance to fi nally rethink the appointment system to at 
least the General Court. Adopting one of the two models proposed by the Commission 
would show the will of the Member States to fi nally trust the judicial institution and its 
51 Ibid.
52 As a consequence of the introduction of the scrutiny to be performed by the panel, the Dutch 
government has introduced a merit-based competition to select its nominees to the Court of Justice. It 
seems like many States are actually following this example. On the contrary, others such as Italy still 
resist in not disclosing their own selection procedures.
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ability to create a synthesis of the different European legal tradition and to create the 
European Union’s law, even without the contribution of an equal number of judges per 
Member States. Moreover, adopting the second system proposed by the Commission would 
mean to put at the center of the discussion the specifi c qualifi cation of the appointees, 
instead of his or her nationality and that would be a small step but yet a strong signal 
towards a less political system of judicial selection. The European Union should put such a 
reform in its future agenda and, at the same time, the Member States should enforce new 
rules for the selection of their nominees, which would ensure transparency of the procedures. 
It would not diminish the sovereignty of the States but it would at least increase the 
perceived legitimacy of the Court.
